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Heather: Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A New Approach

ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY: A NEW
APPROACH
The lawyer's obligation of confidentiality protects communications between attorney and client. It has been a part of AngloAmerican jurisprudence since the reign of Elizabeth 11 and is,
therefore, the oldest of the privileges against the disclosure of
confidential communications. Despite this long history, it has
recently become the focus of heated scholarly debate. The debate
stems from conflicts between confidentiality and other values
which are important to our legal system. For example, a lawyer's
nondisclosure can impede a court's ability to ascertain the truth
about facts material to the disposition of a particular litigation.
Current theories consider conflicts between confidentiality
and other values to be inherently irreconcilable. The proponents
of the various theories disagree only over which conflicts, if any,
require that the lawyer's obligation not to disclose a client's confidences be limited in order to foster other values. The theory that
prevails in the current debate may determine not only the scope
of confidentiality, but, to a significant extent, the role of the
lawyer in our adversary system.
Contrary to current theories of confidentiality, conflicts between the lawyer's obligation of nondisclosure and the court's
discovery of truth are not inherently irreconcilable. In some cases
such conflicts can be resolved in a manner that protects the legitimate interests of the client without subordinating the conflicting
values. An approach which reconciles competing interests will be
explored here in the context of a hypothetical problem of criminal
defense representation. In addition, this approach suggests an
alteration in the theoretical framework within which issues of
confidentiality generally should be analyzed.
I.
CONFIDENTIALITY VERSUS DISCLOSURE: THE CHOICE BETWEEN
PUNISHING THE INNOCENT DEFENDANT AND BETRAYING THE CLIENT

What is the duty of a lawyer if he learns from a client that
the client has committed a crime for which another person has
1. For a concise history of the privilege see 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDEca § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
2. Id. Other privileges include those for marital communications, the privilege covering the physician-patient relationship, and the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination.
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been tried, convicted, and sentenced? Professor Andrew L. Kaufman provides a hypothetical statement of the problem: 3
A sensational murder case in your home town resulted in
the conviction of the defendant for murder after a trial that
turned solely on a question of identification. The conviction was
affirmed and efforts at collateral attack have failed. A client of
yours told you certain facts that have led you to conclude that
he, not the defendant, was the murderer. Your conclusion has
been verified by the client and some independent checking has
led you to be as positive as you can be that he is telling the truth.
Efforts to persuade your client to turn himself in have failed.
What do you do next?
Current theories of confidentiality require a lawyer in these
circumstances to choose between betraying the client's confidence and allowing the punishment of an innocent person. The
values involved-confidentiality, truth, and the life or liberty of
the innocent defendant-are brought into an irreconcilable conflict. The lawyer must decide which value is paramount.
There are four theories of confidentiality to which a lawyer
can refer in deciding how to resolve Professor Kaufman's hypothetical:
A. the theory contained in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility;4
B. the theory of absolute confidentiality;5
value;' or
C. the theory of truth as a paramount
7
D. the theory of personal conscience.
3. Professor Kaufman is a member of the faculty at Harvard Law School. He has
kindly made available this excerpt of the hypothetical which he intends to include in A.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ch. IV (forthcoming).
4. See notes 8-20 infra and accompanying text. The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility on August 12,
1969. It applied to ABA members as of January 1, 1970, and was amended by the House
of Delegates in February 1970, February 1974, and February 1975. Preface to ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY at ii (1975). The Code consists of three parts: Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. The Canons are statements of "axiomatic
norms"; the Ethical Considerations (hereinafter referred to as EC) are aspirational guidelines; the Disciplinary Rules (hereinafter referred to as DR) are mandatory and subject
violators to disciplinary action. Id. PreliminaryStatement at 1c.
5. See notes 21-24 infra and accompanying text. For a thorough discussion of this
theory see M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHicS INAN ADVERSARY SYsTEM (1975) [hereinafter
cited as LAWYERS' ETHIcS].
6. See notes 25-32 infra and accompanying text. For a recent articulation of the
theory see Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975). For an earlier discussion of this view see Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and
the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966).
7. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
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A.

The Code of Professional Responsibility

The Code is not so much a theory of professional responsibility as it is a collection of often contradictory guidelines and rules.
The obligation of confidentiality as set forth in the Code creates
what one scholar calls a "trilemma" S for the criminal defense
lawyer: "[he] is required to know everything about the client's
case, maintain that knowledge in the strictest confidence and, at
the same time, be candid with the court." 9 The lawyer who looks
to the Code in order to resolve Professor Kaufman's hypothetical
can find justification for either a decision to remain silent or a
decision to disclose.
The primary statement of the obligation of confidentiality is
contained in DR 4-101(B) of the Code:'"
[A] lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret["] of his client.
(2)Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3)Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage
of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after
full disclosure.
Disclosure by a lawyer who is faced with the hypothetical would
violate each of these rules.
The Code, however, explicitly provides for exceptions to its
rules against disclosure.1 2DR 4-101(C) allows the lawyer to reveal
"[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.'

3 That

rule also permits the

lawyer to reveal the confidences or secrets of a client where disclosure is necessary for the lawyer "to collect his fee or to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of
wrongful conduct."' 4
8. LAWYERS' ETiCS, supra note 5, at 27-42.
9. Id. Preface at vii.
10. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(B) (1975).
11. For a discussion of the significance of the distinction between a "confidence" and
a "secret" see note 43 infra.
12. Until recently DR 7-102(B)(1) required a lawyer to reveal a confidence or secret
of his client if he received information clearly establishing that his client had perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal and the client refused to rectify the fraud. In
February 1974, the American Bar Association amended the rule to require a lawyer to
reveal a client's fraud "except when the information is protected as a privileged communication."
13. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(C)(3) (1975).
14. Id. DR 4-101(C)(4).
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The Code also contains general considerations which, when
read together, arguably provide lawyers with a basis for making
additional exceptions to the obligation of confidentiality. Lawyers are officers of the court; the Code refers to their role in
bringing about "just and informed" decisions. 5 Ethical Consideration 7-21 reminds the lawyer that "the criminal process is designed for the protection of society as a whole.""6 The Code states
that "[w]hen explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer
should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal
system and the legal profession. 11 7 Finally, the Code asserts that

"[c]ontinuation of the American concept that we are to be governed by rules of law requires that the people have faith that
justice can be obtained through our legal system."'8
I
Can the Code, which justifies disclosure by a lawyer in order
to collect a fee or to prevent an intended crime by a client, at
the same time be read to prohibit a disclosure which saves the life
or restores the liberty of an innocent defendant? As an amalgam
of conflicting rules and policies, the Code enables the lawyer to
justify disclosure or nondisclosure equally well in many circumstances. With regard to the hypothetical, whichever choice was
made, the lawyer would not be subject to disciplinary action. 9
The Code provides no basis for the clear resolution of issues of
confidentiality. Its ambiguity serves neither to foster public confidence in the legal system, nor in the profession. 0
Under the Code, conflicts between confidentiality and other
values are irreconcilable. One value must be chosen as paramount: either the client will be betrayed or the suffering of the
innocent defendant will continue.
15. Id. EC 7-24. "The characterization of a lawyer as an officer of the court is deeply
rooted in history and warranted by the peculiar posture of the lawyer in society." ABA
STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 1.1, Commentary a (1971). The Standards have not
been examined here as a separate source of guidance for the lawyer faced with Professor
Kaufman's hypothetical. The Standards conform to the Code, preserve the "trilemma"
of the Code, and treat conflicts between confidentiality and other values as irreconcilable.
See LAWYERS' ETHIcs, supra note 5, at 36-38. See alsoIn re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
16. Id. EC 7-21. The Code states that the civil adjudicative process is, on the other
hand, designed for the settlement of disputes between parties.
17. Id. EC 9-2.
18. Id. EC 9-1.
19. The Code was written in part to overcome the ineffectiveness of the original 32
Canons of Professional Ethics (adopted in 1908) as a basis for disciplinary enforcement.
Preface to ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY at i (1975).
20, See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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B.

689

The Theory of Absolute Confidentiality

The theory of absolute confidentiality resolves all conflicts
between confidentiality and other values in favor of the lawyer's
duty to preserve the client's confidences. 21 For example, if necessary to preserve the obligation of confidentiality, the lawyer has
a duty to call the client to the witness stand and undertake direct
examination despite knowledge that the client will commit perjury.22 Similarly, the lawyer must attempt to impeach the credibility of a truthful witness if the witness' testimony is prejudicial
23
to the client's case.
The theory is based on the premise that confidentiality cannot be subordinated to other values without undercutting both
the constitutional rights of the client and public confidence in the
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship. Dean Monroe Freedman, a leading advocate of this theory, envisions one exception
to the duty of confidentiality: the very life of an innocent third
party must not be subordinated. 24 For example, if the innocent
defendant in Professor Kaufman's hypothetical were to receive a
death sentence, then Dean Freedman would disclose the client's
confidence.
The theory recognizes conflicts between confidentiality and
other values, considers them irreconcilable, and deems confidentiality the paramount value, with possibly the one exception. The
lawyer faced with Professor Kaufman's hypothetical would find
a clear mandate in this theory: remain silent. The lawyer, however, would not find a means of serving the client's interests without an obvious injustice to an innocent person.
C.

The Theory of Truth as a Paramount Objective

Several efforts have been made to develop rules which would
subordinate the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality to the obligation to assist the court in the discovery of the true facts essential to the determination of guilt and innocence. Early efforts to
make truth a paramount objective were confined to the articulation of such "black-letter" rules as: "[the lawyer] may not en21. LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 5, at 1-8, 27-42 passim; Freedman, Judge Frankel's
Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060 (1975). For one exception to the absolute rule
of nondisclosure see note 24 infra and accompanying text.
22. LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 5, at 27-42; Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility
of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1569
(1966).
23. LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 5, at 43-49.
24. Id. at 6.
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gage in direct examination of his client to facilitate known perjury. "2 The proponents of such rules against absolute confidentiality recognized that their concern was based on a conception
of what values generally were the most important to our legal
system. For example, the author of the quoted rule on perjury
offered this explanation for it: "This is a rule which is so basic
and fundamental to the integrity of our system of justice and the
legal profession that it can never admit of any exception, under
any circumstances.""6
Implicit, therefore, in such "black-letter" limitations on the
scope of confidentiality is the assumption that truth is a
paramount objective of our legal system. More recently, efforts to
limit confidentiality have explicitly relied on the premise that
truth is paramount: absolute confidentiality is "inimical to a
system which has as its end rational decision-making"; the primary role of the advocate is "to assist the trier of fact in making
[an] impartial judgment," 8 and to "promote a wise and informed decision of the case"; 9 confidentiality must end "when it
leads to conduct which destroys the truth or presents perjury to
the fact-finder.""0 Judge Marvin Frankel summarizes the thrust
of this point of view when he advises lawyers to "make truth a
paramount objective." 3'
Carried to its logical extreme, this theory provides a clear
solution to Professor Kaufman's hypothetical: disclose the
client's confidence to remedy the court's error in convicting and
punishing an innocent defendant. Like the theory of absolute
confidentiality, the theory of truth as a paramount objective
avoids the ambiguities of the Code. Once again conflicts between
25. Burger, Standardsof Conductfor Prosecutionand Defense Personnel:A Judge's
Viewpoint, 5 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 13 (1966) (emphasis in original). Chief Justice, then
Judge, Burger also stated that a lawyer who would challenge this rule is "naive and
inexperienced ...

lacking adequate training in his profession ....

[Direct examination

producing known perjury] is a perversion and a prostitution of an honorable profession."
Id. at 12.
26. Id.
27. Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality,64 MICH.
L. REV. 1485, 1489 (1966).
28. Id. at 1487, citing ProfessionalResponsibility:Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A.J. 1160-61 (1958).
29. Noonan, supra note 27, at 1487.
30. Id. at 1492.
31. Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1052
(1975).
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confidentiality and other values are resolved by choosing between
irreconcilable interests.
The advocates of this theory, however, cannot formulate a
broad rule of disclosure which is compatible with the client's fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination and sixth
amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Indeed,
one of the advocates of the theory, Judge Frankel, concedes that
constitutional protections of the criminal defendant are "bedrock
principles" which must prevail over other values. 32 Disregarding
these principles by sharply curtailing the scope of confidentiality
also would undercut the public's willingness to disclose fully all
potentially relevant facts to lawyers. Without such disclosure the
lawyer cannot effectively advise the client or prepare for trial.
D.

The Conscience Theory of ProfessionalResponsibility

The last of the theories currently available to the lawyer
faced with Professor Kaufman's hypothetical regards difficult issues of professional responsibility as matters of personal conscience. 3 Faced with the problem, the lawyer could choose to remain
silent or to disclose, and in either case would be accountable to
no one. The lawyer, however, would not escape the necessity of
choosing either to betray the client's trust or to prevent the innocent defendant from gaining his or her liberty.
II.

RESOLVING THE HYPOTHETICAL: AN ALTERNATE APPROACH TO
CONFIDENTIALITY

Professor Kaufman's hypothetical can be resolved in a manner which does not require the lawyer to subordinate other values
in order to protect the legitimate interests of the client. Legislatures can make two procedures applicable: in camera review and
use immunity. Together these devices will reconcile the otherwise
conflicting values.
32. Id. at 1037. Judge Frankel's recognition of the importance of these principles is
reflected in his draft revision of DR 7-102. Id. at 1057-58. The draft states, in part: "In
his representation of a client, unless prevented from doing so by a privilege reasonably
believed to apply, a lawyer shall .... " (emphasis added). Id. at 1057. By preserving the
option of asserting "a privilege," Judge Frankel retained the very conflicts his draft attempted to resolve in favor of truth. For a forceful presentation on the consequences of
making truth a paramount objective see Rifkind, The Lawyer's Role and Responsibility
in Modern Society, 30 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 534 (1975).
33. This theory provides another way of characterizing the obligations of the Code.
Given the ambiguity of the Code, the lawyer is free to decide issues of confidentiality
according to his conscience. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
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Under an appropriate statute, the lawyer would be required
to disclose to a court, in camera, information establishing a
client's responsibility for a crime for which an innocent defendant
has been convicted. If the court concluded that there had been a
miscarriage of justice, it would be empowered to forward the information to the appropriate prosecutor, contingent on a grant of
use immunity by the prosecutor to the lawyer's client. The innocent person would receive the benefit of the exculpatory information and the client would be in substantially the same position
as if the lawyer had remained silent. Therefore, the procedure
would not require the lawyer to choose between the client and the
innocent defendant.
Would immunity provide the client with effective protection? The federal immunity statutes34 provide an example that
can be analyzed to determine whether immunity would protect
against criminal liability stemming from an attorney's disclosure.
The general immunity statute states:"
[T]he witness may not refuse to comply with the order
[compelling the witness' testimony] on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly
or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of this statute in Kastigarv. United States.3" The case arose when two grand
jury witnesses refused to answer questions and asserted their fifth
amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, notwithstanding the grant of immunity. They were held in contempt
in the district court and raised the constitutional challenge on
appeal.
The KastigarCourt held that the statute places a total prohibition on "use of compelled testimony as an 'investigatory lead"'
and "use of any evidence obtained by focusing investigation on a
witness as a result of his compelled disclosures. ' '37 Thus, the
Court reasoned that the immunity provided by the statute-"by
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003 (1971). Every state has some form of immunity statute.
See 8 J. WICMORE, EvIDENCE § 2281 at 495-508 n.11 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1971).
36. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
37. Id. at 460.
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assuring that the compelled testimony can in no way lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties" 3"-"leaves the witness and the
prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if
the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege." 9 The
Court also reaffirmed the rule announced in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission"° where it was held that immunity protects "a
state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state
law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as
well as federal law."
With regard to Professor Kaufman's hypothetical, immunity
would safeguard the client against criminal liability resulting
from disclosure of a confidence. Kastigar rebuts any argument
that the lawyer's disclosure coupled with immunity for the client
would not be consistent with the client's constitutional rights.4
The proposed solution leaves the client in a position analogous to
that of the Kastigarwitness: in "substantially the same position
4 2
as if the witness had claimed the . . . privilege.
38. Id. at 461. The petitioners argued that it would be impossible to identify, by
testimony or cross-examination, the "subtle" ways in which testimony that the petitioners
would be compelled to give under the statute might disadvantage them. Id. at 459. The
Court answered this argument by stating that once a witness has demonstrated that he
testified under a grant of immunity, the prosecution has the burden of showing that their
evidence was gained from "an independent, legitimate source." Id. at 460, quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964). The Court added:
This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate, is not limited to a
negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to
prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source
wholly independent of the compelled testimony.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972). Therefore:
A person accorded this immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002, and subsequently
prosecuted, is not dependent for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity
and good faith of the prosecuting authorities.
Id.
39. Id. at 462.
40. 378 U.S. 52, 78 (1964); accord, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 456-58
(1972).
41. Effective immunity also protects the interrelated safeguards of the presumption
of innocence and the prosecutorial burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
42. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972). The Court's use of the words
"substantially the same position" indicates that the fifth amendment does not provide
an absolute right to remain silent, but only an absolute right to be protected from criminal
liability as a result of compelled testimony. The scope of the fifth amendment protection
articulated by Kastigaraffords a "rational accomrodation between the imperatives of the
privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify." Id. at
445-46. Dean Freedman failed to consider the court's decision in Kastigar when he asserted that the fifth amendment grants an "'absolute constitutional right to remain
silent.'" Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060, 1064
(1975), quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S 478, 491 (1964).
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This solution to Professor Kaufman's hypothetical would, of
course, invade the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship.
Such disclosure arguably might embarrass or inconvenience the
client." Even so, disclosure is constitutionally sound. The rational accommodation of conflicting values achieved by the immunity statute upheld in Kastigarreflects the constitutional fabric as a balance of fundamental interests. Justice Frankfurter has
stated: "[N]o constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so
none should suffer subordination or deletion."" Accordingly, the
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship cannot be given preference to the interest of an innocent person in obtaining exculpatory information where both interests can be served by a rational
accommodation.
In Ullmann v. United States45 the Supreme Court rejected a
challenge to the constitutionality of an immunity statute. The
43. The obligation of confidentiality serves not only to protect the constitutional
rights of the criminal defendant but also "to promote freedom of consultation of legal
advisers by clients." 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The Code
serves this policy by requiring that the lawyer maintain the confidentiality of the client's
secrets, as well as confidences. A " confidence" refers to that information protected by
the attorney-client privilege as an evidentiary matter. A "secret" refers to other information gained in the attorney-client relationship which the client has expressly requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or detrimental to the
client. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,DR 4-101(A) (1975). The rule prohibits
disclosure of either confidences or secrets. Id. DR 4-101(B). The Code also expressly
mentions, however, that the scope of this obligation of confidentiality is broader than the
scope of the attorney-client privilege, which does not embrace the "secrets" of the client.
Id. EC 4-4. In short, because of the complex of values which bear upon the judicial
resolution of disputes, the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality in court is narrowed.
Protection against the client's inconvenience or embarrassment, preserved by the prohibition against the lawyer's disclosure of "secrets," yields to the accommodation of various
interests made during a litigated case or controversy.
44. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956). In support of this statement,
Justice Frankfurter quoted the following portion of an address by Senator Albert J. Beveridge to the American Bar Association in 1920:
If liberty is worth keeping and free representative government worth saving,
we must stand for all American fundamentals-not some, but all. All are woven
into the great fabric of our national well-being. We cannot hold fast to some
only, and abandon others that, for the moment, we find inconvenient. If one
American fundamental is prostrated, others in the end will surely fall. The
success or failure of the American theory of society and government depends
upon our fidelity to every one of those inter-dependent parts of that immortal
charter of orderly freedom, the Constitution of the United States.
Beveridge, The Assault upon American Fundamentals, 45 A.B.A. REP. 188, 216 (1920)
(emphasis in original), as quoted in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 n.3
(1956).
45. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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dissent argued that "the government brings infamy on the head
of the witness when it compels disclosure." 6 Justice Frankfurter,
writing for the Court, stated:4 7
[A]s this Court has often held, the immunity granted need only
remove those sanctions which generate the fear justifying invocation of the privilege: "The interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate
himself-in other words, to give testimony which may possibly
expose him to a criminal charge."
The Ninth Circuit has held that where attorney and client
have been granted use immunity prior to the attorney being instructed to testify before a grand jury, the attorney cannot refuse
to answer on the grounds that such testimony would undercut the
client's residual expectation of privacy stemming from the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship.48 The court stated:"
46. Id. at 454 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In English practice, a separate privilege
applied to facts involving disgrace or infamy, irrespective of criminality. This privilege,
however, has fallen into disuse. 8J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2255 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Wigmore points out that arguments which attack immunity statutes as unconstitutional
on the ground that there is a fifth amendment privilege against disgrace have been rejected whenever advanced in this country. Wigmore views such arguments as ignoring the
independence in principle, and in history, of the distinction between the two privileges.
Accord, Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956); In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d
882, 891-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S 978 (1975).
47. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956), quoting Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
48. In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
49. Id. at 891 (emphasis in original). The court noted that an attorney-client relationship may generate an expectation of privacy which in the absence of immunity can
support a fifth amendment claim of privilege. Id. The court reasoned, however, "if use
immunity can constitutionally be used to invade a client's privacy, to the extent of forcing
him to testify to acts which may amount to legal and moral crimes, it certainly can be
used to force disclosure of information [which would be protected only by considerations
of the privacy of the attorney-client relationship]." Id. The court added that "[a]ny
disclosure a party does not wish to make will entail some type of chilling effect. However,
not all such 'chills' amount to an impairment of constitutional rights." Id. at 892.
The court also rejected an argument that the invasion of the attorney-client relationship undercut the client's sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. The issue was not discussed in detail. It is difficult to understand how a sixth amendment claim would, under
these circumstances, affect the balance of values involved. It is unprecedented to argue a
denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel in a setting where the client has been
protected from any criminal liability as a result of the attorney's actions. Claims of a
denial of effective assistance of counsel arise in the context of appeal from conviction. In
Michaelson, and in the solution proposed here to Professor Kaufman's hypothetical, the
right to counsel cannot have been ineffective given the protection against criminal liability
afforded by use immunity.
Historically, the policy of promoting freedom of consultation with lawyers has been
used to justify confidentiality only in circumstances where disclosure would expose the
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In striking the delicate balance between the information needs
of the courts in administering justice and a party's or witness's
right to privacy, it is sufficient that testimony elicited from a
person not be used against him without a valid waiver of his
Fifth Amendment privilege or the granting of immunity. But a
party's or witness's residual rights of privacy; that is, the discomfort any witness has in testifying against his wishes about
matters within his knowledge, cannot outweigh the court's interest in getting the facts necessary to make a reasoned and
informed decision. Were this not so, no immunity, indeed no
subpoena, could stand-since both invade upon this residual
right of privacy.
In a recent decision in the Southern District of New York, the
court noted the need to balance the client's expectation of privacy
against the court's and the public's interest in disclosure of relevant information 0 Judge Pierce stated:5'
The general purpose of this privilege is "to promote freedom of
consultation of legal advisers by clients." [Citation omitted.]
To this end the client must be assured that information conveyed in confidence to the attorney will not be ordinarily disclosed. Arrayed against this consideration is the public interest
in obtaining disclosure of every man's evidence. [Citations
omitted.] When these two principles clash a balance must be
struck and an appropriate resolution will not be forthcoming by
a wooden application of s6me general formula. The answer may
lie, instead, in an analysis of the particular circumstances giving
rise to the problem, ever mindful of the policy considerations
which furnish a basis of the two principles.
In sum, the grant of immunity to a client whose confidences
were disclosed by his lawyer in camera for the purpose of setting
free an innocent person would fully protect the legitimate interests of the client. Disclosure of client confidences in camera, regardless of how incriminating the information may be, is a wellclient to criminal liability. See, e.g., ABA CoMm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No.
287 (1953); LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 5, at 4-5; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291
(McNaughton rev. 1961); cf. In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179, 183-84 (10th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 276 (1976) (semble). There is no support for the proposition that where
there is no danger of liability, the expectation of privacy alone justifies a theory of absolute

confidentiality. But see People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262, 271-72, 244 N.E.2d 29, 34-35, 296
N.Y.S.2d 327, 334 (1968).

50. In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Martin R. Stolar, 397 F. Supp. 520, 524 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).

51. Id.
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settled practice. 2 The grant of immunity would protect the client
from criminal liability and a protective order would insure that
the client's expectation of confidentiality was preserved in every
practicable way consistent with the need to release the innocent
defendant. 3 The solution provides a rational accommodation between the "imperatives of the privilege" and the legitimate demand of our criminal justice system that the innocent prisoner be
afforded the benefit of exculpatory information. 4
The suggested solution to Professor Kaufman's hypothetical
differs from those provided under current theories of confidentiality in that it accommodates the interests in conflict rather than
selecting one interest as paramount. Does such a solution suggest
an alteration in the analysis of conflicts between confidentiality
and other values generally?
III.

RECONCILING CONFLICTS IN OTHER CONTEXTS

Dean Freedman uses a recent controversial case to demonstrate that the obligation of confidentiality is absolute: 5
[I]n Lake Pleasant, New York, a defendant in a murder case
told his lawyers about two other people he had killed and where
their bodies had been hidden. The lawyers went there, observed
the bodies, and took photographs of them. They did not, however, inform the authorities about the bodies until several
months later, when their client had confessed to those crimes.
52. Confidences are furnished to the courts routinely for in camera determination of
the legitimacy of an assertion of the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
53. Under the protective order the prosecution could not make the identity of the
client or other information available to the public, or otherwise use such information to
inconvenience or embarrass the client. No significant impediment to disclosure remains
under the proposed procedure; the expectation of privacy and the privilege protecting it
are only two factors in a balancing of interests. Wigmore states that one of the conditions
precedent to sustaining claims of privilege is that "[t]he injury that would inure to the
relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greaterthan the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 8 J. WIGM1RE, EVIDFCE § 2285
(McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis in original); cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring): "[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
54. Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972). It is not suggested here
that the attorney-client relationship may be invaded by courts or prosecutors whenever
immunity is granted to the client. This comment has focused on situations where
compelling interests-such as the innocence of a third party-conflict with the obligation
of confidentiality. The state's interest in prosecution alone is not sufficiently compelling
to compromise the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship.
55. LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 5, at 1.
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In addition to withholding the information from police and prosecutors, one of the attorneys denied information to one of the
victims' parents, who came to him in the course of seeking his
missing daughter.

Despite the public outrage over the failure of the lawyers to dis-

close the location of the bodies and the efforts of the local prosecutor to indict the lawyers for failing to reveal knowledge of a
crime,5 6 Dean Freedman concludes that the lawyers not only

acted properly but would have breached their professional responsibility had they disclosed the information." He states:5 8
It must be obvious at this point that the adversary system,
within which the lawyer functions, contemplates that the lawyer

frequently will learn from the client information that is highly
incriminating and may even learn, as in the Lake Pleasant case,
that the client has in fact committed serious crimes. In such a
case, if the attorney were required to divulge that information,
the obligation of confidentiality would be destroyed, and with

it, the adversary system itself.

Following the procedure suggested in this comment, the lawyers in the Lake Pleasant case would be required to disclose in
camera their knowledge of where the bodies were buried. The
court could then disclose the information to the prosecution, contingent on a grant of use immunity to the lawyer's client. The
56. Id. Dean Freedman reports that "[mIembers of the public were generally
shocked at the apparent callousness on the part of the lawyers, whose conduct was considered typical of an unhealthy lack of concern by lawyers with the public interest and with
simple decency." Id. Dean Freedman rests his theory that confidentiality must "upon all
occasions be inviolable," id. at 5, quoting ABA CoMiM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, OPINION 150 (1936), quoting E. THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 94 (1914), in part

on grounds that a restricted scope of the privilege would undercut public confidence in
the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship, making clients generally unwilling "to reveal
to the lawyer all information that is potentially relevant." Id. Given the public reaction
to the Lake Pleasant incident, it is speculative at best to suggest that the procedure
presented here would result in a general loss of confidence in the sanctity of the attorneyclient relationship:
[The privilege's] benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is
plain and concrete ....
It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest
possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.
8 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See cases cited id. at n.6; cf.
Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972) ("[i]t is well
established that the privilege protects against real dangers, not remote or speculative
possibilites"); In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882, 892 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978
(1975).
57. LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 5, at 2.
58. Id. at 5.
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prosecution in turn would notify the parents and have the bodies
recovered.9
This resolution of the Lake Pleasant case, which protects the
interests of the client while accommodating the public interest
and "simple decency," 6 raises another conflict of values. The
court would have to decide whether it is more important to recover the bodies or to leave the path of potential prosecution
unfettered regarding an undiscovered crime. In camera disclosure
shifts the locus of this conflict from the individual attorney to the
courts. The interests of the client are no longer a part of the
conflict; they are protected whether the court discloses the information to the prosecution-thus requiring the grant of immunity-or decides to retain the information in camera without
further disclosure.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The constitutional system is a complex of fundamental values and aspirations. In cases where these values conflict, rational
accommodations must be reached whenever possible. The lawyer's obligation of confidentiality protects fundamental values
but it is not an absolute obligation; the obligation must yield
where disclosure serves other important values without undercutting the legitimate interests of the client. Contrary to current
theories of confidentiality, conflicts between confidentiality and
other values are not inherently irreconcilable. There are means
available within our adversary system by which the lawyer can
serve the client, the interests of justice, and the underlying policies of confidentiality despite disclosure of incriminating
information."1
Fred D. Heather
59. The parents and the public, however, would not be informed of the source of the
information. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
60. LAWYERS' ETmics, supra note 5, at 1.
61. A lawyer need not wait for legislation before attempting to use the proposed
approach to resolve conflicts between confidentiality and other values. The lawyer faced
with Professor Kaufman's dilemma, or that posed by the Lake Pleasant case, would be
free to inform the court of the general nature of the problem faced and request in camera
review of the information. The court, upon granting review, would be free to inform the
prosecution of the nature of the information, contingent on a grant of use immunity to
the client and subject to a protective order. A lawyer who attempts to invoke such procedures would perhaps create the impetus for appropriate legislation.
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